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INTRODUCTION 
Twenty years after the launch of trade 
negotiations, the EU and Mercosur concluded 
their Agreement in Principle on 28 June 2019. 
Although regional organisation Mercosur is 
composed of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and 
Uruguay, Brazil is the largest member and much 
of the discussion – and this policy briefing – 
focuses on the economic and environmental  
 
impact of trade specifically with Brazil. The 
preferential trade agreement (PTA), which fits 
into the context of a larger Association 
Agreement between the two regions, has not 
been without controversy: since the relaunch of 
negotiations in 2016 after a long hiatus, it has 
been criticised by civil society groups, farmers 
and politicians around the EU. Nevertheless, the 
agreement has never attracted as much public 
attention as other agreements with North-
Atlantic partners, such as TTIP or CETA, which 
were subject to extensive public opposition from 
various EU member states during their 
negotiation and ratification periods respectively. 
However, this changed in August 2019, as 
wildfires spread throughout the Amazon – many 
of them set intentionally by Brazilian farmers to 
illegally deforest land to be used for farming of 
cattle, one of the key export goods in the EU-
Mercosur agreement. Combined with the way in 
which Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro reacted 
to the natural disaster, public awareness and 
outrage has vastly increased. Critics have 
highlighted in particular the mismatch between 
the EU’s climate ambitions – especially the 2015 
Paris Agreement on combating climate change – 
and the terms of the trade deal. This lack of 
consistency between the EU’s internal climate 
policy and its external policies threatens not only 
the effectiveness of these policies in combatting 
The recently signed EU-Mercosur 
agreement has met with criticism from civil 
society, farmers and politicians around the 
EU. These criticisms have been amplified by 
recent forest fires in the Amazon. Although 
the Von der Leyen Commission’s strategic 
documents highlight the importance of 
mainstreaming climate change and 
environment throughout all policies, 
including trade, the EU-Mercosur 
agreement lacks enforceable measures to 
this end. In light of recent events, ratification 
of the EU-Mercosur agreement by all 
member states seems unlikely. However, the 
EU itself could also use this opportunity to 
send a clear message as to where its priorities 
lie by taking unified action to shift the terms 
of the trade agreement.  
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climate change, but also calls into question the 
credibility of the goals themselves. 
Some member states took unilateral action 
directly – including cutting aid towards the 
Amazon Fund and publicly criticising 
Bolsonaro’s reaction. However, with the renewed 
emphasis the 2019-2024 European Commission 
political guidelines put on mainstreaming climate 
change across EU internal and external policy, it 
is worth examining how the EU itself can react to 
the situation. 
CLIMATE AND DEFORESTATION IN THE 
EU-MERCOSUR AGREEMENT 
The EU-Mercosur agreement removes tariffs on 
many goods. On the EU side, the main added 
value is the removal of tariffs on cars and car 
parts, while the Mercosur countries benefit from 
an open market for the export of beef and sugar 
– leading to the agreement being labelled as ‘cars 
for cows’ by environmentalists.  
The agricultural chapter in particular has led to 
controversy for two main reasons. First, these 
products are sensitive for agricultural exporters 
of sugar and beef in the EU, especially Ireland 
and France. The contrast between the EU’s 
small-scale farms and the large ranches in 
Mercosur countries have led to concerns that the 
agreement may threaten the EU model and its 
stronger standards of environmental protection 
and animal welfare. Second, the environmental 
consequences of cattle farming in Mercosur 
countries has led to fears for the climate. Beef 
farming is one of the main causes of (often illegal) 
deforestation in the Amazon, leading to a doubly 
negative climate effect, through both 
deforestation and emissions from the livestock. 
Additionally, many NGOs have been critical of 
the EU’s willingness to cooperate with the 
Bolsonaro government, which has already 
committed human rights violations against 
indigenous peoples and environmental activists 
since its election in January 2019. 
These fears have led the EU to place a particular 
emphasis on measures to prevent deforestation in 
the EU-Mercosur agreement. Like all of the EU’s 
PTAs, it includes a chapter on trade and 
sustainable development; however, in addition to 
the EU’s standard references to protection of the 
environment as an important principle, the EU-
Mercosur agreement contains two points 
specifically relevant to the situation in Brazil.  
The first of these is a specific reference to the 
Paris Agreement in the article on trade and 
climate change (Article 6). This references the 
United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) and commits all 
parties to implement the Paris Agreement. This 
could be seen as a particular measure put into 
place after Bolsonaro threatened to withdraw 
Brazil from the Paris agreement early in his 
election campaign, although he reneged on this 
promise later in the campaign. 
The second is an article on trade and sustainable 
forest management (Article 8). This states that 
the parties will encourage trade in sustainably 
harvested timber and ensure the inclusion of local 
and indigenous communities in these supply 
chains, as well as sharing information and 
cooperating on the issue. While the fact that this 
exists in an agreement including the largest part 
of the Amazon – the largest rainforest in the 
world – is hardly surprising, the Commission 
backed up this article with a communication, 
released shortly after the Agreement in Principle, 
showing that EU consumption was responsible 
for 10% of global deforestation. Combined with 
the measures on supply chain management in the 
EU-Mercosur agreement (Article 11), this has put 
the emphasis on comprehensive, multilateral 
action by both states and companies. This focus 
on deforestation is more detailed than measures 
contained in other agreements, including the EU-
Andean Community agreement with Colombia, 
Peru and Ecuador (also Amazon basin countries) 
concluded in 2013, which did not contain any 
specific articles on deforestation. 
Despite these articles, however, the EU-
Mercosur agreement does not move radically 
beyond the EU’s general approach in trade 
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agreements, with low enforceability of the 
chapter on trade and sustainable development – 
a tendency that has been highlighted by the 
academic literature on EU PTAs (Horn, 
Mavroidis and Sapir, 2010). This chapter is 
subject to a specific dispute settlement 
procedure: a non-compliance complaint is first 
discussed in government consultations, and if it 
remains unresolved then an independent panel of 
experts is called to report and make public 
recommendations. This stands in contrast to the 
more stringent dispute settlement mechanism 
and arbitration procedure applicable to other 
chapters (outlined in Title VIII of the text). As a 
result, the agreement gives the EU little 
possibility to take stringent action on 
environmental problems – such as intentionally-
lit wildfires or Brazil’s withdrawal from the Paris 
agreement – once the agreement is in place. 
THE CURRENT SITUATION 
The agreement as it currently stands is an 
‘Agreement in Principle’, which is not a final text 
and – as the name suggests – not legally binding. 
All parties will now undertake legal scrubbing of 
the agreement to create the final text, which will 
be translated before being submitted to the 
Council and the European Parliament. 
Given that the EU-Mercosur agreement is a 
mixed agreement – containing provisions that fall 
under member states’ competence as well as EU 
competence – it must be signed and ratified by 
both the EU and all member states before 
coming into force. Ratification in the member 
states follows national procedures, generally 
involving approval by national – and sometimes 
regional – parliaments. This means that one 
country, or even one region, can prevent an 
agreement from coming into effect, as was 
demonstrated by the Walloon postponement of 
the CETA agreement in 2017.  
In August, the heads of two member states – 
Ireland and France – threatened to block the 
agreement in the Council if Brazil did not take 
action and fulfil its environmental commitments. 
In July, the Irish parliament had already voted 
down the agreement in a non-binding, symbolic 
vote (Halpin, 2019). And in the strongest sign of 
discontent thus far, in September the Austrian 
lower house adopted a legally binding motion 
obliging the government to veto the agreement 
once it reaches the Council (Hanke and Von der 
Buchard, 2019). While tensions between Brazil 
and France have now simmered down, the 
Austrian parliament’s decision highlights the 
sensitivity of the issue and the strong opposition 
that remains in several countries. 
Meanwhile, in a letter to EU High 
Representative Federica Mogherini, Finland – the 
current holder of the EU presidency – has 
suggested another route: temporarily banning 
imports of Brazilian beef, and subsequently 
excluding these from the agreement to 
disincentivise farmers from lighting fires in the 
first place.1 While this was originally planned to 
be discussed in the Council during September or 
October, climate issues were pushed off the 
agenda by other issues, including Brexit and 
enlargement. As such, the issue remains 
unresolved and the EU’s response unclear. 
LOOKING FORWARD: IS A SOLUTION 
POSSIBLE? 
Although the situation is still evolving and the 
final outcome remains unclear, the next steps 
seem difficult, given the staunch opposition in 
several member states and sections of society. 
The two most likely outcomes are that the 
agreement is either blocked by individual 
Member States in the Council – which seems a 
near-certainty unless the Austrian parliament 
reverses its motion – or held up at the ratification 
stage by individual national or regional 
parliaments. The latter has tended to be the case 
in the past, notably during CETA negotiations, as 
mentioned above. In this case, the EU can 
provisionally apply the agreement pending 
ratification, essentially meaning that those parts 
of the agreement falling under EU competence 
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come into effect once the European Parliament 
has ratified the agreement. 
A third outcome, which would be unique at EU 
level, would be for the EU to implicitly or 
explicitly threatening to change the agreement to 
ban the import of Brazilian beef – as suggested in 
the Finnish letter to Mogherini. On Twitter, the 
president of the European Parliament’s INTA 
committee, Bernd Lange, also endorsed using a 
particular negotiating stance and eventually even 
adjustment of the agreement rather than a simple 
veto. While this would be popular among 
agricultural and environmental interests in the 
EU, it would also be a highly sensitive move, as it 
threatens unravelling the tricky negotiating work 
undertaken over the past two decades. Although 
it admittedly seems unlikely that the EU would 
even consider reopening the negotiations – not 
least due to the loss of political face that it would 
suffer – a similar effect may be able to be 
achieved through side letters or memoranda of 
understanding attached to the trade agreement. It 
is possible that a temporary ban on beef – 
combined with the threat of reopening the long-
running negotiations or adding declarations – 
would be enough to spur the Bolsonaro 
government to take stronger action on the 
situation and clean up its act on the environment. 
As the situation currently stands, the EU-
Mercosur agreement does not look likely to be 
signed and ratified by all member states any time 
soon. (Even under ordinary circumstances, 
ratification can take years.) However, the three 
outcomes outlined here are not equal in the image 
of the EU that they portray. In options one and 
two – blockage by certain member states, either 
at the signature or ratification stages – the EU 
seems divided and unable to speak with one voice 
in international negotiations. In contrast, if the 
EU takes the third option and works a form of 
conditionality into the agreement – essentially 
making the enforceability of the climate and 
deforestation measures stronger – this sends a 
clear message to Brazil and other countries where 
the EU’s priorities lie. This conditionality could 
echo the sort that is prevalent in other areas of 
EU external action – including, notably, 
enlargement, where the EU inserts requirements 
that countries must meet to become candidate 
members, with the reward of access to the EU 
market (Schimmelfenig, 2008). Moreover, if the 
agreement can be reworked to provide for more 
stringent climate or environmental provisions, 
twenty years of negotiations do not go to waste – 
and the EU’s legitimacy as a negotiating partner 
is better preserved. In this sense, it is extremely 
positive that there is even any discussion about 
taking trade measures against Brazil.  
Such stronger conditionality has long been a 
concern of researchers and advocacy groups 
(Lowe, 2019), but it seems only more relevant 
with the incoming Commission’s mandate: a 
strong focus on the EU Green New Deal, 
climate-neutrality before 2050 and a 
mainstreaming of climate concerns across all 
areas of EU policy (including cohesion, 
transition, external affairs and trade). To succeed 
in this ambitious goal, new ways of approaching 
external negotiations will be necessary. Of 
course, using the ‘carrot’ of EU market access to 
shape environmental outcomes is a risky move 
when dealing with leaders who come to power on 
a platform of nationalism, mercantilism and 
protectionism. Nonetheless, trade remains one of 
– if not the most – important levers the EU has 
to affect other policy areas. With all eyes on the 
Amazon, the EU-Mercosur agreement gives the 
EU an opportunity to back up their climate 
ambitions with concrete action. 
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